In a period defined by aggressive assertions of federal authority and the steady expansion of executive power, a federal court in Albany has issued a decision that serves as both a constitutional recalibration and a warning. In United States v. State of New York, Judge Mae A. D’Agostino upheld New York’s Protect Our Courts Act (POCA) and two 2018 executive orders issued by then-Governor Andrew Cuomo, rejecting the federal government’s sweeping preemption challenge. Her opinion is not merely a statutory interpretation exercise. It is a landmark reaffirmation that government authority must be rooted in law, not convenience, and that states retain sovereign power over the operation of their judicial systems.
The case is, on its surface, a dispute about immigration enforcement. But once examined carefully, it becomes clear that the decision reaches far deeper. It touches on the nature of federalism, the enduring force of common-law protections, the boundaries of executive power, and the structural integrity of courts as constitutional institutions. It also reveals something essential for today’s moment: the judiciary still possesses the ability—indeed, the duty—to contain executive overreach.
For those who analyze institutional misconduct, civil rights, and the misuse of governmental authority, the POCA decision is not just relevant. It is instructive.
I. Understanding POCA and the State’s Effort to Protect Court Access
When New York enacted the Protect Our Courts Act in 2020, it did so with a clear statutory purpose: to “facilitate continued access to the justice system and courts by all members of the community without fear of immigration-related consequences.” The law was crafted in response to a sharp and alarming surge in civil immigration arrests around courthouses—arrests that had risen by more than 1,200 percent over a short span. These arrests were targeting people appearing for criminal cases, civil disputes, domestic violence hearings, child custody matters, and even family court mediation sessions.
Victims stopped coming to court. Witnesses stopped cooperating. Defendants avoided mandated appearances. Entire judicial proceedings began to buckle under the weight of public fear.
The Legislature saw this for what it was: a direct threat to the integrity and functioning of the state courts.
But POCA was not the first state-level barrier erected against unregulated federal intrusion. In 2018, then-Governor Andrew Cuomo issued Executive Order 170 and Executive Order 170.1, both of which sharply limited the circumstances under which New York State and local law enforcement could assist federal immigration authorities in the absence of a judicial warrant or a clear statutory mandate. These directives barred state agencies and officers from inquiring about immigration status, from voluntarily providing non-public information to ICE, and from participating in federal civil immigration actions unless strictly required by law. Together, EO 170 and 170.1 were designed to prevent New York law enforcement from being transformed into de facto federal immigration agents, and they reflected a fundamental separation-of-powers principle: the federal government cannot conscript state employees to execute federal civil-immigration priorities that Congress has not expressly authorized.
When the Justice Department filed suit, it did not simply challenge POCA. It challenged these executive orders as well, seeking to dismantle New York’s entire legal framework designed to protect court access and maintain the independence of its judiciary.
Judge D’Agostino, however, upheld the full suite of protections.
II. A Major Federalism Moment: The Court Rejects Preemption
The Justice Department argued that POCA obstructed federal immigration enforcement and was therefore preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). But Judge D’Agostino’s analysis cut through this claim with clarity.
The INA is entirely silent on civil immigration arrests in state courthouses. And silence, especially on matters of federalism, is not authorization. Congress did not grant ICE the authority to conduct courthouse arrests. And because Congress did not speak on the subject at all, it could not have intended to preempt longstanding state protections governing court access.
The court emphasized that preemption occurs only when Congress clearly expresses an intent to override state law. But here, there was no such expression. The federal government’s argument was not grounded in statutory text—only in executive practice and preference.
This distinction matters. In an era when executive agencies routinely adopt enforcement policies without legislative endorsement, the POCA decision reestablishes a simple rule: the federal government must derive its authority from Congress, not from internal memos or operational needs.
New York’s sovereign authority to regulate its court system remains intact. A state’s power to protect the integrity of its courts is not something the federal executive can redefine by implication.
III. Reviving the Common-Law Court-Access Privilege: A Protection for Courts, Not Individuals
One of the most compelling aspects of the decision is Judge D’Agostino’s deep dive into the ancient common-law privilege protecting individuals from civil arrest in connection with court attendance. This principle—dating back centuries—provides immunity from civil arrest while individuals are traveling to court, appearing in court, or returning home after proceedings.
What the decision highlights, however, is that this privilege is structural in nature. It is not a personal entitlement. It exists to protect the courts themselves.
If litigants, defendants, victims, translators, and witnesses fear that appearing in court will expose them to arrest for unrelated matters, they will choose not to come. And when they do not come, cases collapse. Evidence is lost. Justice becomes impossible.
The court understood this risk. It recognized that the privilege is a judicial safeguard—one designed to ensure that courts retain the ability to function independently, free from coercion or disruption by external actors. And unless Congress unmistakably directs otherwise, states retain the authority to codify and enforce this protection.
Judge D’Agostino’s reasoning reframes what many have mistakenly treated as a public policy debate about immigration. It is not that. It is a constitutional debate about the sanctity of the courts.
IV. Executive Convenience Is Not the Source of Federal Power
A central pillar of the federal government’s argument was that ICE required broad discretion to arrest individuals in courthouses because such locations made enforcement more efficient. But Judge D’Agostino was unpersuaded. The court held that executive convenience is irrelevant in determining whether state law is preempted.
ICE could not point to a single statutory provision granting authority to conduct civil arrests in courthouses. It could not identify legislative history supporting a congressional mandate. And it could not rely on executive branch memoranda to create power where none exists.
This portion of the opinion is a powerful rebuttal to a larger trend: the normalization of executive agencies expanding their authority through practice rather than law.
Whether it is immigration enforcement, policing, public safety, or employment screening, the pattern is familiar:
Agencies expand their power through informal guidance.
Internal policy gradually substitutes for statutory authority.
Operational necessity becomes a pretext for bypassing legal limits.
A gap between what the law authorizes and what agencies actually do widens.
The POCA decision restores the proper order. The court insists that the executive’s authority must come from Congress—not from institutional preference or administrative habits.
This ruling is a direct challenge to modern administrative overreach. It reminds us that law, not bureaucracy, defines the limits of government.
V. New York’s Sovereign Authority to Protect Court Functioning
Another powerful dimension of the opinion lies in its affirmation of New York’s duty to ensure that its judicial system remains accessible, safe, and functional. By the time POCA was enacted, courthouse arrests had already disrupted proceedings across the state. Domestic violence victims stopped coming to court. Witnesses refused to testify. Parents avoided appearances in family court. Defendants missed hearings.
The Legislature acted not to interfere with federal immigration policy, but to protect the very operation of the courts. Judge D’Agostino recognized this reality. POCA, she noted, serves compelling state interests: maintaining judicial dignity, preventing intimidation, and ensuring equal access to justice.
These are not peripheral concerns. They go to the core of state sovereignty. If state courts cannot function, the state cannot enforce its laws, resolve disputes, or protect its residents. The judiciary becomes compromised.
The federal government attempted to recharacterize POCA as an immigration obstruction statute. But the court refused that characterization. It reframed POCA within its proper context—as legislation central to the preservation and functioning of New York’s constitutional institutions.
VI. A Blueprint for Confronting Broader Institutional Abuse
The POCA decision is not just a victory in a federalism dispute. It has broader ramifications for understanding government overreach across agencies and jurisdictions. Many of the issues Judge D’Agostino addressed mirror patterns seen in state and local institutions:
police departments using unlicensed psychologists
agencies deploying unauthorized drug-testing methods
misuse of sealed records in violation of statutory protections
municipal agencies creating de facto penalties through informal administrative labels
structural manipulation of disciplinary and promotional systems
The underlying problem is the same: government actors substituting “policy” for “law.”
The POCA decision shows courts can reclaim their role in drawing boundaries around administrative power. It shows how judicial opinion can re-anchor governance in statutory text rather than bureaucratic impulse.
In this sense, the ruling serves as a model for analyzing other forms of institutional misconduct. It suggests that the judiciary can—and should—reject the fiction that agencies can enlarge their own authority simply because they claim it’s efficient.
VII. What Comes Next: Litigation, Politics, and the Future of Federal Power
The decision is now part of the federal record, but the legal battle is not over. The Justice Department may appeal. Other circuits may approach similar cases differently, raising the possibility of a split in authority. And with shifting political priorities in Washington, future administrations may revisit the enforcement policies at issue.
Yet the court’s reasoning creates a durable foundation for future challenges. It enshrines the principle that executive agencies cannot override state protections without explicit statutory grounding. It reinforces that federal silence does not equal federal supremacy. And it emphasizes that state courts, as separate constitutional organs, cannot be subordinated to executive branch preferences.
The implications extend far beyond New York. They reach into the broader conversation about executive power, state autonomy, judicial independence, and the institutional health of American democracy.
Conclusion: A Decision That Reclaims the Line Between Law and Power
The opinion in United States v. State of New York is more than a defense of POCA. It is a reaffirmation of constitutional boundaries at a moment when those boundaries are under pressure. It restores the proper relationship between Congress and the executive branch, between the federal government and the states, and between operational convenience and the rule of law.
It tells us something fundamental: power must come from statute, not from desire.
Agencies do not acquire new authority by claiming necessity. And the executive cannot erode state sovereignty simply because it prefers a more efficient enforcement landscape.
In a time when many institutions have blurred the line between what is lawful and what is expedient, Judge D’Agostino’s decision stands as a constitutional corrective. It reasserts that the rule of law—not administrative improvisation—defines the scope of governmental authority.
And for those who study, litigate, or challenge government overreach, it offers something increasingly rare: judicial recognition that courts remain the final guardians against unauthorized power.